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Abstract 
 
What factors affect a scientist’s choice of research problem? Qualitative research in the 
history, philosophy, and sociology of science suggests that this choice is shaped by an 
“essential tension” between the professional demand for productivity and a conflicting 
drive toward risky innovation. We examine this tension empirically in the context of 
biomedical chemistry. We use complex networks to represent the evolving state of 
scientific knowledge, as expressed in publications. We then define research strategies 
relative to these networks. Scientists can introduce novel chemicals or chemical 
relationships—or delve deeper into known ones. They can consolidate existing 
knowledge clusters, or bridge distant ones. Analyzing such choices in aggregate, we find 
that the distribution of strategies remains remarkably stable, even as chemical knowledge 
grows dramatically. High-risk strategies, which explore new chemical relationships, are 
less prevalent in the literature, reflecting a growing focus on established knowledge at the 
expense of new opportunities. Research following a risky strategy is more likely to be 
ignored but also more likely to achieve high impact and recognition. While the outcome 
of a risky strategy has a higher expected reward than the outcome of a conservative 
strategy, the additional reward is insufficient to compensate for the additional risk. By 
studying the winners of 137 different prizes in biomedicine and chemistry, we show that 
the occasional “gamble” for extraordinary impact is the most plausible explanation for 
observed levels of risk-taking. Our empirical demonstration and unpacking of the 
“essential tension” suggests policy interventions that may foster more innovative 
research. 
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Introduction 
 
How do scientists choose a research problem? Many factors influence the decision, from 
past interests and training (1) to serendipitous encounters with salient expertise and 
information (2). Conflicting professional pressures intensify this choice. Career 
advancement requires reliable productivity, typically achieved by incremental 
contributions to established research directions. High standing in the scientific 
community, by contrast, requires important, original contributions, often achieved by 
pursuing risky new directions (3). These conflicting demands create a tension between 
two broad strategies: productive “tradition” and risky “innovation” (4). When following 
the conservative strategy and adhering to the research tradition in their domain, scientists 
achieve publication with high probability, remaining visibly productive but forgoing 
opportunities for originality. When following a risk-taking strategy, scientists fail more 
frequently, and may appear unproductive for longer periods (3)1. If a risky project 
succeeds, however, it may have profound impact, generating substantial new knowledge 
and winning broad acclaim (5). This strategic tension mirrors other well-known 
dichotomies: reliable “succession” versus risky “subversion” (6) or “relevance” versus 
“originality” (7) in the sociology of science; “conformity” versus “dissent” or 
“discipline” versus “rebellion” in the philosophy of science (8); and “exploitation” versus 
“exploration” or “refinement” versus “risk taking” in the study of innovation (9). Recent 
theoretical work supports this picture of an “essential tension” (4), by highlighting the 
distinctive contributions (10) and rewards (11) associated with conservative and risk-
taking strategies. 
 
Such scholarship suggests that more important findings tend to be more unexpected, 
given available knowledge and established methods of inquiry. Established methods tend 
to produce few surprises, and encourage neglect of unexpected findings when they occur. 
By contrast, Thomas Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions illustrated the key role of 
unexpected findings in supplanting scientific theories (5). But how prevalent are the 
strategies that yield unexpected findings? And what risk and reward are associated with 
them? Qualitative and theoretical research suggests that such strategies should be rare, 
risky, and highly rewarded. In this article, we examine these questions quantitatively, in 
the context of biomedical chemistry. First, we define and measure the prevalence of five 
broad strategies that scientists use to select chemical relationships for study. We perform 
this analysis in aggregate, pooling the articles published each year and counting strategies 
observed in each pool. We then demonstrate that the relative frequency of these strategies 
is unrelated to available opportunities to pursue them. Indeed, we find increasing focus 
on established knowledge within biomedicine over time. Then we link strategies to the 
average scientific importance of the findings they produce, and discover that rare 
strategies tend to produce more important findings. Finally, we consider how distinct 
reward mechanisms influence the selection of scientific strategies. We show that ordinary 
rewards through citations are insufficient to compensate scientists for their risky gambles. 
We then analyze the distribution of strategies in articles associated with extraordinary 
                                                
1 Examples include Andrew Wiles while proving Fermat’s Theorem or Frederick Sanger 
while developing the “Sanger method” for DNA sequencing. 
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achievement (measured through very high citation counts and prizes), and suggest that 
the potential for such achievement may motivate scientists to observed levels of risk-
taking.  
 
Most quantitative analyses of large-scale scientific behavior use the document as the 
fundamental unit of analysis (12, 13) and leverage citation data to identify innovations 
(14) and outline the structure of scientific fields (15). We adopt a content-based approach 
that uses basic conceptual entities (in this case, chemicals) and their relationships as the 
fundamental units of analysis. These relationships weave a network of research 
possibilities, corresponding to Simon and Newell’s notion of “the space of search paths” 
or “network of possible wanderings” involved in human cognition ((16), p.82). Under 
this metaphor, scientists move through the network of knowledge and add to it through 
their research efforts. 
 
We propose the following coarse taxonomy of research strategies, corresponding to 
structurally distinct contributions to the network of scientific knowledge. Figure 1 
illustrates how a scientist facing a network of known scientific relationships could choose 
to make a jump, new consolidation, new bridge, repeat consolidation, or repeat bridge 
(17, 18). A researcher may propose a relationship involving completely unexplored 
entities, making a jump beyond current knowledge (17)2. She may also test a relationship 
between previously explored entities, either providing a new (not previously published) 
relationship or repeating a relationship proposed before. New and repeat relations, in 
turn, can be either consolidations or bridges. This distinction rests on the fact that the 
knowledge network partitions naturally into clusters of closely related chemicals, 
mirroring scientific subfields (see Methods for an explanation of how we identify these 
clusters). Joining entities within the same cluster provides further consolidation of the 
cluster, deepening knowledge in that particular domain. Linking entities from distinct 
knowledge clusters creates a bridge between them, altering the broad connectivity of the 
knowledge network and weaving loosely connected regions of knowledge together more 
tightly.  
 
Results and Discussion 
 
Our network is built from 6,455,756 abstracts in the National Library of Medicine’s 
MEDLINE collection, published 1934 – 2008 and annotated by NLM with two or more 
chemical entities; see Materials and Methods. Chemical annotations were introduced in 
1980 and applied to all journals indexed subsequently, accounting for the pre-1980 
annotations. We focus analysis on 1983 – 2008 to limit the effect of the introduction of 
indexing on our results; see SI. We construct an evolving network (15, 18) using these 
annotated articles. By 2008, the network has 181,078 nodes and 84,709,977 links. Nodes 
represent chemicals; if two chemicals appear in the same article in year t, we infer a 
relationship that connects the chemicals and add a link between the corresponding nodes 
                                                
2 She may explicitly set out to design a new compound (e.g., creating a new 
pharmaceutical) or may find evidence of a new entity and set out to characterize it (e.g., 
describing a new receptor or antibiotic).  
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in the network for year t +1 (19). For example, a 2007 article (20) includes a new 
consolidation within a neurobiology-related subfield, showing that neuronal tubulin-
preferring agent NAPVSIPQ, a neuroprotective oligopeptide, defends neurons against 
neurotoxic kainic acid. Network links between chemicals persist (although this 
assumption can be relaxed; see SI), and chemicals can be linked repeatedly. Note that 
articles are often annotated with more than two chemicals, and therefore contribute more 
than one chemical relationship. All relationships appearing in a given year enter the 
network together, as if published simultaneously. While an approximation, this keeps the 
network evolution tractable. This procedure yields a time-ordered sequence of weighted 
networks over chemicals. In a given year, we characterize the links associated with each 
publication using one of the five strategies. This characterization allows us to count the 
total number of times we observe each strategy in a given year.  
 
Prevalence and stability. Pooling these counts across all years, we find that the 
frequency of each strategy in the published literature from 1983 – 2008 appears to be 
inversely related to its plausible risk of failure. Repeat statements were six times more 
frequent than new or jump statements (85.8% versus 14.2%). New bridges and new 
consolidations were more common than jumps by roughly the same proportion (12.4% 
versus 1.8%). It is likely that strategies that build incrementally on former knowledge 
appear more frequently not only because they are pursued more frequently, but also 
because non-incremental strategies are prone to fail, remaining unpublished and invisible 
to science; see SI3.  
 
Using the strategy counts for a given year, we can also compute their relative frequency 
within that year. The resulting distribution of scientific strategies has remained 
remarkably stable over the period studied; see Figure 2A (solid lines) and SI. From 1983 
– 2008, the fraction of total links in a given year corresponding to “new” strategies has 
changed little, with jumps the rarest, followed by consolidations, then bridges.  
 
This stability is surprising. Biomedical chemistry has changed enormously over the past 
few decades. For example, the number of distinct chemicals that appear in MEDLINE 
annotations increased by an order of magnitude between 1980 and 2008 (see Fig S1). 
Because of this growth, there are vastly more new links to explore than known links (a 
factor of 22 more in 1983, growing to a factor of 188 by 2008). Likewise, because 
knowledge clusters are small relative to the entire system (the largest shrinks from 27.5% 
of the network in 1983 to 12.8% in 2008) the number of possible bridging links grows 
faster than the number of possible consolidating links (see Fig. S4). The pattern and 
stability of strategic choices suggests that scientists are not responding to the changing 
space of research possibility. Even if an overwhelming fraction of potential new links can 
be discarded reliably as physically impossible or otherwise unworthy of exploration—
without doing a single experiment—scientists are still not taking full advantage of 
opportunities to explore new relationships between chemicals. 
                                                
3 Non-incremental strategies, when successful, may be easier to publish in high-prestige 
outlets (as their results are considered more novel). Nevertheless, we believe the results 
of incremental research are relatively easy to publish, albeit in lower-impact journals. 
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Stability and attention. The stability of the strategy distribution despite dramatic 
changes in research opportunities suggests that scientific attention may be narrowing in 
focus. To explore this, we introduce a simple, generative model of strategy selection (17). 
In this model, scientists (represented by a single abstract agent) independently and 
randomly choose a strategy at time t based on the number of available links 
corresponding to each strategy at time t −1 . The choices of this agent are weighted using 
bias parameters that coarsely summarize how much more salient some opportunities are 
than others: 
€ 
ν  and 
€ 
ρ  are the biases for new and repeat relationships, 
€ 
θn  and
€ 
θ rare biases 
for new and repeat consolidations, and the bias for jumps is normalized to 1 (Materials 
and Methods). We assume that our agent first chooses between jump, new, or repeat 
links—the most risk-relevant distinctions—and then makes a secondary decision between 
contributing a consolidation or bridge. Other model formulations give similar results.  
 
Conceptually, we imagine that the agent repeats this procedure until it has made the same 
number of choices we observe in a given year. Using the aggregate history of strategic 
choices discussed above (i.e., the number of times each strategy appears in a given year), 
we infer bias parameters that maximize the likelihood our agent will generate the 
observed history. The bias parameters characterizing the agent thus provide an “average” 
description of the preferences of the scientific community for the various strategic 
opportunities.  
 
Figure 2A (dashed line) shows that this model predicts observed behavior reasonably 
well, with a high correlation between known and predicted values (Pearson’s 
  
R = 0.983 ). 
The significant trends in parameters suggest that scientists filter out more new 
opportunities and become more locally focused as knowledge grows. Figure 2B (left 
axis) indicates a sharply increasing preference for repeating known links instead of 
exploring new ones. Figure 2B (right axis) shows that the preference for new 
consolidation over bridging has grown, and may be leveling off, indicating a similar local 
focus in the exploration of new relationships. 
 
Risk and rewards. We turn next to our claim that rare, risky strategies should be more 
highly rewarded. Figure 3 shows that rare and risky strategies, like jumps and new 
consolidations, are indeed rewarded with more citations. In information theory, the self-
information or surprisal 
  
I( pi) = log(1/ pi) = −log( pi) measures the information associated 
with observing outcome i of a discrete random variable (21). Highly improbable 
outcomes are surprising, so this measure assigns a large value to low probability 
outcomes and quantifies how “surprising” they are. In our case, the outcomes are 
observations of a given research strategy; observations of rare strategies are more 
surprising. For a given year, we can define the surprisal of each strategy using our 
generative model. If P(strategy) is the probability that the representative agent will 
choose a given strategy in a given year, then the surprisal of that strategy is 
− logP(strategy) ). Strategy surprisal positively predicts the mean citations received by 
papers containing at least one instance of that strategy during the period 1983-2002, for 
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which we have reliable citation data4. When a strategy is an order of magnitude less 
probable (e.g., 0.5 vs. 0.05), it will receive 2.26 additional citations, on average. In fact, 
surprisal explains 29.2% of the variation in mean citations (Materials and Methods). The 
size of this effect supports our proposal that important findings tend to result from 
surprising strategies. Indeed, the relationship is robust to a variety of tests, including 
distinct subfield definitions, use of median rather than mean citations, and tests that 
explicitly account for the overdispersion of citation data; see SI. We also confirm the 
intuition that rare strategies tend to be riskier, in the sense that their citation impact is less 
predictable: the standard deviation in citations is higher for rare strategies. Strategy 
surprisal explains 28.6% of variation in the standard deviation in citations to papers 
containing at least one instance of that strategy. This result implies that rare, riskier 
strategies are often less successful at garnering attention than more conservative 
strategies. When they do attract attention, however, they attract more attention (i.e., 
citations) than conservative strategies.  
 
But do rare, risky strategies attract enough attention to balance the chance of utter failure 
(i.e., no publication)? In other words, is a scientist who chooses a risky strategy being 
rational? We cannot directly observe from our data the probability that a particular 
strategy will succeed or fail; the links in our sample come from projects that did produce 
a publication. We can provide bounds on the failure probability, however, if we assume 
that scientists select strategies only to maximize citations (6). To perform this risk 
analysis, we extend our strategic taxonomy to “project” strategies characterizing entire 
articles5. Scientists may pursue a repeat project with no new relationships or chemicals; a 
new project with at least one new relationship but no new chemicals; or a jump project 
with at least one new chemical. The same relationship that links rare strategies with 
citations also holds for these project strategies (see SI for a detailed analysis.) The 
expected citation count for a particular strategy Ε(S)  is the product of the probability of 
success p(S)with the mean citations for articles employing that strategy. Our use of 
mean citations (22) reflects the simplest possible utility function for scientists with no 
risk-aversion or risk-seeking. We compute mean citations from the data, averaging over 
the period 1983 – 2002: 8.38 for repeat, 11.00 for new, and 12.90 for jump. For a risk-
neutral scientist to be indifferent between strategies, i.e., for the choice of new or jump 
instead of repeat to be rational, then Ε(repeat) = Ε(new) = Ε( jump) . This equality 
implies that p(new) = 0.76 ⋅ p(repeat)  and p( jump) = 0.65 ⋅ p(repeat) . A priori, it seems 
unlikely that a new or a jump project is only 24% or 35% less likely to succeed than a 
conservative repeat project. This argument suggests that repeat is very likely to be the 
dominant strategy from a rational choice perspective, i.e., the one that maximizes 
expected citations. This confirms one “half” of the essential tension. Scientists are 
strongly incented by systems of professional evaluation, which often rest on citations, to 
pursue conservative repeat strategies. But we are left with a puzzle: while scientists 
                                                
4 We can actually estimate the optimal fraction of links in a paper corresponding to a 
given strategy, i.e., the fraction that maximizes citations; see Supporting Information on 
strategy mixtures. 
5 To perform this analysis, we need to associate each article to a unique strategy, hence 
the “project”-level strategies. 
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eschew most opportunities for high-risk, high-impact work, they still engage more risk 
than if they only sought to maximize citations—for example, if they were only concerned 
with job security and a stable career. 
  
Risk and awards. Beyond job security, scientists are motivated by the desire for 
significant impact and recognition. They wish to leave their mark on scientific history 
(23). This level of achievement is captured by the most highly cited papers (22); even 
more so by awards and prizes. This level of recognition is thought to require riskier, 
original contributions (4, 24). Hence we predict that top cited articles and prize winners 
will deploy rare, risky strategies more frequently than the typical article or scientist. 
Figure 4 verifies with an aggregate analysis that top cited articles deploy significantly 
more novel strategies than all articles (see Figure 4B) as a fraction of links contributed, 
with the strongest enrichment in jumping and new consolidation. Articles written by 
authors who have won one of 137 different prizes in biomedicine and chemistry show a 
similar pattern of enrichment. Articles written by winners of the most elite awards 
(including Nobel prizes) not only introduce new chemicals more frequently than those 
written by typical scientists, but also more frequently introduce new relationships within 
knowledge clusters (Materials and Methods). A new, integrating linkage within a 
chemical cluster is likely to attract the attention of the established community whose 
articles inscribe the connections that define the cluster. Indeed, elite award winners may 
define or transform our understanding of these clusters. The same pattern obtains when 
we analyze awards by field, grouping them into biomedicine (Figure 4C) and chemistry 
(Figure 4D). See Table S2 for a complete list of awards analyzed. These results confirm 
the other half of the essential tension, linking risky innovation to extraordinary scientific 
achievement.  
 
Conclusions 
 
Taken together, our results provide strong quantitative evidence that scientists’ choice of 
research problems is indeed shaped by an “essential tension” between conservative 
productivity and risky innovation (4). Understanding the research process remains a 
central challenge for science studies, and improved understanding will be key to 
improved science policy (25). Science is a complex system (26), and new methods like 
ours can identify processes that govern its evolution. Despite our novel methods, this 
study has several limitations. Protocols for chemical annotation at the National Library of 
Medicine are not uniform over time. Our method necessarily misses relationships whose 
chemicals are not in the NLM annotation. By considering all co-mentioned chemicals, we 
allow some “false relationships,” failing to distinguish between substantial and incidental 
associations; see SI. Moreover, our taxonomy of research strategies does not reflect the 
variety of factors scientists consider. Finally, strategies that failed to yield publishable 
findings are excluded from our analysis by our focus on publications. More precise 
extraction of chemical relationships (25, 27), a broader full-text corpus including research 
proposals, and richer models can transcend these limits.  
 
Our research suggests one reason why unexpected findings that change the landscape of 
science are so infrequent: pursuing them is a gamble, without enough citation payoff, on 
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average, to justify the risk. Nevertheless, science benefits when individuals overcome the 
strategic preferences that orient them toward established islands of knowledge (17) in the 
expanding ocean of possible topics. Early breakthroughs in literature-based discovery 
illustrated the power of linking islands of knowledge together (28). Our results explain 
why such discovery methods remain so fruitful for science. Our findings also suggest 
new research questions in the science of science, e.g., how strategies change over a 
scientific career and whether high-achieving scientists initiate more risky projects, are 
more far-sighted, or simply luckier.  
 
To be sure, not all scientists should pursue risky strategies. “Normal” science that 
characterizes a known relationship more deeply has its own value. Nevertheless, 
stimulating innovation is an important goal of science policy, and we close by suggesting 
two policy levers to promote risk-taking. Since career pressure is a powerful incentive for 
conservative behavior, decoupling job security from productivity early on can encourage 
originality, as was the case at Bell Labs (29). So can funding scientists rather than 
projects, as at the Howard Hughes Medical Institute6. The other lever sits outside the 
tension between productivity and posterity: funding agencies can lower the barriers to 
risky projects by funding them more aggressively. These interventions may be able to 
counter the stable conservatism we uncover here. 
 
Materials and Methods 
 
Knowledge Clusters. We identify knowledge clusters using the map equation community 
detection algorithm. We apply it to the relevant network for each year and select the best 
result out of 50 randomly seeded iterations (30, 31). This algorithm minimizes the 
description length of a random walk on the network given a two-level labeling scheme. 
Heuristically, it partitions the network such that the walker tends to spend a long time 
within a community before transitioning to another, thereby picking out subsets of nodes 
with dense intraconnection. It is one of the few algorithms that provides good speed and 
performance on networks of our size (32). Our knowledge clusters or “subfields” reflect 
the structure of chemical knowledge as expressed in journal articles: chemicals that 
appear together frequently in articles will be clustered together. We confirmed the 
robustness of key results against alternate subfield definitions, including those induced by 
journal classifications and externally curated ontologies; see SI.  
 
Multinomial Confidence Intervals. The data in Figs. 2A, 4B, 4C, and 4D measure the 
fraction of links corresponding to each strategy in various slices of the network (by year; 
by citation; by prize winner status). We treat the fractions as estimating the parameters of 
a multinomial distribution with 5 types and model the data as draws from this 
distribution. We use the confidence interval proposed in (33) with the tighter bound 
introduced by Goodman (34). If we observe ni  instances of strategy i out of N 
observations, the (1−α ) -confidence interval for the proportion of links using strategy i, 
pi  is given by: 
                                                
6 These interventions raise further questions about how to identify the promising 
scientists who receive such support; this is a fascinating research topic in its own right. 
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χ 2 + 2ni ± χ 2[χ 2 + 4ni (N − ni ) / N
2(N + χ 2 )
, where χ 2 is the upper (α 5)×100 -th percentile of 
the χ 2 -distribution with one degree of freedom. Generically, for a multinomial with k 
types, this would be the (α k)×100 -th percentile. 
 
Generative Model of Attention and Strategy Selection. We assume that scientists choose 
from five possible strategies: jump; new consolidation; new bridge; repeat consolidation; 
and repeat bridge. For the purposes of this model, we treat each instance of strategic 
choice as an independent draw (in reality, these choices are correlated at the article-level, 
but this complicates the analysis). Thus 
 
€ 
P( jump) +P(new,consolidation)+ P(new,bridge)+ P(repeat,consolidation) + P(repeat,bridge) =1 
 
We assume that researchers first choose over jump, new, or repeat and then choose 
between consolidation or bridge7. Hence the probabilities factorize: 
 
€ 
P( j)+ P(n)⋅ P(c | n) + P(n)⋅ P(b | n) + P(r)⋅ P(c | r) + P(r)⋅ P(b | r) =
P( j) + P(n)⋅ P(c | n) + P(b | n)( ) + P(r)⋅ P(c | r) + P(b | r)( ) =1  
 
Once new or repeat is established, scientists choose either a consolidation or a bridge; 
€ 
P(c | n) + P(b | n)( ) = P(c | r) + P(b | r)( ) =1, and 
€ 
P( j)+ P(n) + P(r)=1. These equations 
fully determine the space of possible events.  
 
Researchers (as modeled by a representative agent) independently and randomly choose a 
strategy at time t based on the number of possible links corresponding to each strategy in 
the network at time t. This number is weighted according to a bias parameter that 
coarsely summarizes the factors influencing this decision. Let 
€ 
Jt  be the number of 
potential jumps, 
€ 
Ct  the number of new consolidations, 
€ 
Bt  the number of new bridges, 
€ 
ˆ C t  
the number of repeat consolidations, 
€ 
ˆ B t  the number of repeat bridges, 
€ 
Rt = ˆ C t + ˆ B t  the 
number of repeat links, and 
€ 
Nt = Ct + Bt  the number of potential new links. Repeat 
variables track the total number of repeat links; if a link has been repeated 3,000 times, it 
contributes 3,000 to the count. This accounting is consistent with our probabilistic 
framework; the likelihood that a researcher encounters the opportunity for a repeated link 
is in direct proportion to its number of repetitions. The probability of each strategy is: 
 
                                                
7 Several alternative models can be formulated, including a model that associates a 
parameter to each strategy or one that makes the choice of jump, consolidation, or bridge 
primary and new or repeat secondary. While all models fit the data reasonably well, the 
model presented here gives a good fit while also being easy to interpret and presenting a 
plausible sequence of decisions. 
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€ 
P( j) = Jt
νNt + ρRt + Jt
P(n,c) = P(n)⋅ P(c | n) = νNt
νNt + ρRt + Jt
⋅
θnCt
θnCt + Bt
P(n,b) = P(n)⋅ P(b | n) = νNt
νNt + ρRt + Jt
⋅
Bt
θnCt + Bt
P(r,c) = P(r)⋅ P(c | r) = ρRt
νNt + ρRt + Jt
⋅
θ r ˆ C t
θ r ˆ C t + ˆ B t
P(r,b) = P(r)⋅ P(b | r) = ρRt
νNt + ρRt + Jt
⋅
ˆ B t
θ r ˆ C t + ˆ B t
 
where 
€ 
ν  is the bias for new relationships, 
€ 
ρ  the bias for repeats, 
€ 
θn  for new 
consolidation, and
€ 
θ rfor repeat consolidation. The bias for jumps is set to 1; as the 
number of possible jumps decreases as a function of time, 
€ 
ν  and 
€ 
ρ  decrease as a function 
of time as well. We assume the total number of chemicals to be discovered is 250,000. 
Experiments with subsets of the data indicate that changing the total number of chemicals 
changes the numerical value of parameters but not their qualitative behavior. 
 
Parameter values are obtained by maximum likelihood estimation, using the observed 
number of links of each type in the six previous years to construct the likelihood function. 
Define 
€ 
nC (t)  as the number of new consolidations observed in year t, and the others in 
like manner; then 
€ 
data[t] = [nJ (t),nC (t),nB (t),n ˆ C (t),n ˆ B (t)]. The likelihood of a single 
year of publication data is: 
 
€ 
L(data[t]) = P( j)n J ( t )P(n,c)nC ( t )P(n,b)nB ( t )P(r,c)n ˆ C ( t )P(r,b)n ˆ B ( t )  
 
and the likelihood of all publication data observed between 
€ 
t0 and 
€ 
t f  is: 
L(data[t
0
, t f ]ν,ρ,θn,θr ) = L(data[t])
t=t0
t=t f
∏ = P( j)
nJ (t )P(n,c)
nC (t )P(n,b)
nB (t )P(r,c)
n
Cˆ
(t )
P(r,b)
n
Bˆ
(t )
t=t0
t=t f
∏
 
where we explicitly show the dependence of the likelihood function on the parameters 
(Note that we assume a uniform prior on the parameters). The parameters are then given 
by:
  
{ν,ρ,θn,θr} = argmax{L(data[t0, t f ]ν,ρ,θn,θr )} = argmax{log L(data[t0, t f ]ν,ρ,θn,θr )( )}
  
The maximum of the likelihood function is calculated using the downhill simplex 
algorithm implemented in scipy.optimize, i.e., fmin. 
 
Credible Intervals. We assign Bayesian credible intervals to the parameter estimates in 
Fig. 2B by Monte Carlo sampling (35). For a given set of parameters Θi = {ν,ρ,θn,θr}
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and likelihood function L(data,Θi )we explore the likelihood function using the 
Metropolis-Hastings procedure with sequential parameter updates. We begin at the 
optimal parameter values calculated by the downhill simplex algorithm. With each 
iteration, we adjust one parameter, cycling through the parameters in a fixed order. The 
new parameter is chosen by sampling randomly and uniformly from an interval centered 
on its current value. Given the current parameters Θcurrent  and the proposed parameters
Θproposed , we calculate L(data,Θcurrent )and L(data,Θ proposed ) . If L(data,Θ proposed )  > 
L(data,Θcurrent )  we accept the transition; if L(data,Θcurrent )  > L(data,Θ proposed ) , we accept 
the transition with probability paccept =
L(data,Θproposed )
L(data,Θcurrent )
. The intervals for parameter 
updates are chosen such that the rejection rate is ≈ 30% . At each iteration, we record the 
current parameter values. We performed 200,000 iterations for each parameter estimate. 
95% credible intervals for the parameters are the values containing 95% of the sample. 
To assign intervals to the ratio in Fig. 2B, we conservatively make the intervals as large 
as possible given intervals [ρL, ρU ] and [ν L,νU ]  by using 
ρL
νU
, ρU
ν L
#
$
%
&
'
( . 
Regressions of Citation on Surprisal. Surprisals for each strategy in a given year             
(
€ 
= − log[P(strategy )]) are computed using the probabilities given by our generative 
model. Citations are assigned to articles by linking the MEDLINE abstracts to the 
ThomsonReuters citation database; each article is then assigned the total citations it 
received in the three years after its initial publication (the typical half-life for most 
citation data). If the article is not in the ThomsonReuters database, it is omitted from this 
analysis. Approximately 2/3 of the MEDLINE articles link to a ThomsonReuters record 
with citation information. We restrict analysis to 1983-2002 due to decreased citation 
coverage post 2005. 
 
We use the surprisal for a strategy in a given year to predict the mean citations and 
standard deviation in citations received by articles in that year with at least one instance 
of that strategy. The data display some heteroscedasticity, with more scatter in the 
residuals for larger values of surprisal. To correct for this, we perform regressions in 
STATA using the HC3 heteroscedasticity correction. In all regression models, the two-
tailed p-value for the null hypothesis (i.e., a regression coefficient is 0) is less than 
0.0001. Full tables of coefficients, t-statistics, and confidence intervals are given in the 
SI. 
 
Surprisal is a highly significant  predictor of mean citations, F(1,98) = 30.96; (Prob > F) 
< 0.001; , where (Prob > F) is the p-value of the observed F statistic8. The 
majority of remaining variation is explained by the average increase in mean citations as 
a function of time; see Figure S7A and B. Year alone is a significant predictor of mean 
citations: F(1,98) = 143.62; (Prob > F) < 0.001; . A combined model 
including both surprisal and year as predictors captures 76% of the variation in mean 
                                                
8 We find the same behavior if we drop jumps, which have the highest surprisal, from the 
regression; see SI for this and many other robustness checks. 
R2 = 0.2916
R2 = 0.5212
  
12 
citations, F(2,97) = 103.36; (Prob > F) < 0.001; , with surprisal remaining a 
highly significant predictor, F(1,97) = 51.87, (Prob > F) < 0.001. 
 
Our findings are similar for standard deviation in citations. Surprisal is a highly 
significant predictor: F(1,98) = 24.68; (Prob > F) < 0.001; . Year is a 
significant but weaker predictor: F(1,98) = 33.57; (Prob > F) < 0.001; . A 
combined model captures 44.4% of the variation, F(2,97) = 26.62; (Prob > F) < 0.001; 
; surprisal remains highly significant, F(1,97) = 25.36, (Prob > F) < 0.001. 
 
Prize Winners.We compiled a list of 137 different prizes and awards in biomedicine and 
chemistry, drawing on the category pages for biology awards, medicine awards, and 
chemistry awards on Wikipedia:  
 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category:Biology_awards; 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category:Medicine_awards 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category:Chemistry_awards 
 
The majority of prestigious (and many less prestigious) prizes are listed, providing a 
broad sample of achievement—from field-specific (e.g., the Anselme Payen award, 
related to cellulose chemistry) to world-recognized  (e.g., the Nobel Prize in Physiology 
or Medicine). We eliminated all prizes awarded for non-research reasons (e.g., teaching 
or history) or awarded to students. For the remainder, we searched the lists of winners 
against PubMed and if possible selected three articles by each prize winner. Awards that 
focus on biomedicine have deeper coverage in MEDLINE and so are better represented 
in our analysis than field-specific awards in areas peripheral to biomedicine (e.g., in 
ecology or entomology). We thus devoted more time to completing our coverage of 
articles associated with major or broad awards—which should be well represented in 
MEDLINE. These major and broad awards are thus more complete (i.e., more prize 
winners have associated articles) than narrower awards or those that only partially 
overlap the biomedical focus of PubMed. 
 
We expanded the initial set of articles by finding the name of the prize winner in the 
MEDLINE entry for each of 1-3 “seed” articles. We then mapped that name using the 
Author-ity tool (36) to a cluster of partially disambiguated author names. We searched 
MEDLINE for the names in each author cluster. All retrieved publications written up to 
30 years before the date of the award were associated with that prize winner. This process 
could introduce false positives for common names if we or our research assistants mis-
assigned any seed articles, thereby associating a prize winner with an article written by 
another scientist (the Author-ity author clustering is quite conservative and is unlikely to 
contribute to this error). These false positives correspond to “typical” rather than award-
winning scientists, however, and will likely behave like the rest of the typical population, 
causing us to underestimate the size of the prize effect. Prize winners with non-English 
characters in their names are also underrepresented; e.g., the Swedish Nobel Prize winner 
Sune Bergström is not well mapped to an Author-ity cluster and so some of his articles 
are not represented in our figures. Such false negatives also cause us to underestimate the 
enrichment of risky strategies in the strategy distribution of prize winners. Thus our 
R2 = 0.7602
R2 = 0.2862
R2 = 0.1895
R2 = 0.4442
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results should be viewed as a conservative estimate of the difference between prize 
winners and the pool of all scientists. 
 
The “Elite, general” prizes in Figure 4B were selected as follows. We included the two 
Nobel Prizes; prizes explicitly mentioned as being “precursors” to a Nobel; the top 
general awards given by professional societies in the US and the UK (the American 
Chemical Society, the National Academy of Science, and the Royal Society of 
Chemistry); and the Wolf Prizes, which have similar stature and prestige. The resulting 
list of 12 prizes is: Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine; Nobel Prize in Chemistry; 
Louisa Gross Horwitz Prize; Lasker-DeBakey Clinical Medical Research Award; Albert 
Lasker Award for Basic Medical Research; Gairdner Foundation International Award; 
NAS Award in Chemical Sciences; Priestley Medal; Corday-Morgan Medal; Grand Prix 
Charles Leopold Mayer; Wolf Prize in Medicine; Wolf Prize in Chemistry. 
 
See supporting information for additional technical details and discussion: 
http://dl.dropbox.com/u/9831990/Supporting_Information_Tradition_Innovation.pdf 
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Figures 
 
Fig. 1. Scientific strategies on a network. Nodes represent chemicals and links 
represent chemical relationships.  
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Fig. 2. Stable strategies and dynamical attention. (A) The empirical frequency of each 
strategy (solid line) with 95% confidence intervals smaller than the solid lines 
(Materials and Methods). Dotted lines show the predictions of our generative model. 
In 1980 (black arrow) chemical annotation is introduced in MEDLINE; see SI. This 
distorts parameter estimates until 1987 (parameters for year t are inferred from the six 
previous years). (B, left axis) The ratio (orange) indicates an increasing concentration 
on established knowledge relative to new possibilities. (B, right axis) The preference 
for new consolidations over new bridges (plum) grows and stabilizes. This interest 
does not carry over to repeat work (lavender). 95% Bayesian credible intervals, 
shown in lighter colors, are very small (Materials and Methods).  
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Fig. 3. Strategies and citation impact. Low-frequency strategies are correlated with 
higher mean citations (29% of variation explained). The surprisal of a strategy in year 
t (horizontal axis) plotted against mean citations received by papers published in year 
t containing at least one instance of that strategy. Much of the remaining variation is 
explained by adding year of observation to the model, as citations tend to increase 
with time (76% of variation explained by the combined model; the surprisal 
coefficient remains significant).  
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Fig. 4. Strategies shift for high impact scientists. (A) Pooling all papers published from 
1983-2002, we find a distribution of strategies similar to that observed in any year (Fig. 
2A). We judge pools of high impact articles and authors against this baseline (see Table 
S2). (B) Highly cited articles or those published by prize winners in the 30 years before 
receipt of a prize show an enhancement of jumps and consolidations. We assessed this for 
137 prizes offered for research contributions in biology, medicine, and chemistry, 
representing 7594 awardees and 241,176 articles. The vertical axis measures the observed 
strategy frequency in each pool as a percentage of the baseline value. We emphasize that 
while the increase in frequency is small, relative to the baseline it is substantial. 95% 
confidence intervals are indicated by the boxes outside each data point. (C) and (D) As in 
(B) but for biological and medical prizes, and chemical prizes, respectively. The heavy 
line shows the aggregate behavior of all prizes; confidence intervals are smaller than the 
symbols (Materials and Methods). We also show the most prestigious, general prizes in 
these fields; confidence intervals not shown. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
